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Whether Congress is yielding its constitutional powers is a central issue for 
American political institutions at the end of the twentieth century.  Scholars 
who have closely examined Congress’s behavior ask both whether Congress 
fully uses the powers and maximizes the institutional capacities it is entitled to 
under separation of powers, and whether Congress can check the institutional 
powers of other branches and defend individual rights more effectively than an 
independent judiciary or judicial review.  Congress is clearly active in shaping 
social and political policies.  In the American political system, Congress has 
the important role of representation and supporting states or constituents in 
their conflicts with the national government.  Members of Congress may use 
the process of representation to meet district and constituency needs rather than 
expand Congress’s collective institutional capacity.  Decentralization has been 
a major trend in Congress in the last third of the twentieth century.  Individual 
members have increased their ability to support their own constituents in the 
representative process, but may have decreased their ability to act 
institutionally and compete with external institutions.  Members often exhibit a 
wide gulf between their use of institutional power and authority for individual 
versus institutional beliefs. 
Is Congress abdicating its power?  An answer can focus on how Congress 
defines its authority and role as a representative institution and whether 
Congress mainly anticipates or responds and reacts to social and political 
events.  Fisher defines abdication as “to relinquish a right or power . . . giving 
to someone else something that belongs to you” and argues that Congress has 
failed to protect key legislative prerogatives.1  Congressional authority and 
strategies for interaction with other branches in a separation of powers context 
 
* Professor Political Science and Public Policy, Saint Louis University.  B.A. Brooklyn College, 
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 1. Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 931, 932 (1999). 
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are undermined by abdication.  Williams addresses these issues using public 
choice analysis and suggests differences between institutional and individual 
strategies within Congress. 2  He notes there is an important distinction 
between congressional abdication and congressional delegation, and that line is 
currently blurred.3  Williams argues Congressional abdication concerning 
Executive War Powers is “not one of power, but of political responsibility.”4 
Congress’s relationship with the federal judiciary is an important aspect of 
its authority.  Congress and the Supreme Court consider many issues of 
defining constitutional boundaries through statutory and constitutional 
interpretation.  Congressional legislation is often central to the definition of 
boundaries of power and authority for various national and state governing 
units, and the federal courts often hear cases concerning redefined government 
authority.  This article will examine Congress-Supreme Court relationships and 
strategies of exercising power in the federal system. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL-JUDICIARY RELATIONSHIPS 
The patterns of congressional relations with the federal judiciary are 
complex and dynamic.  Congress has a variety of constitutional means to 
control and influence judicial processes and decisions.  Congress has control 
within constitutionally set boundaries over the jurisdiction of federal courts, 
the budget of the Supreme Court, and the Court’s appellate jurisdiction by 
removing certain topics.5  Congress may also pass statutes that revise Supreme 
Court decisions or minimize the impact of Court rulings.  The Supreme Court 
can interpret Congress’s override and may alter the legislation in whole6 or in 
part.7  Congress and the Court can interact in more than one round of statutory 
interpretation and reinterpretation.  In a recent visible example, the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act,8 the Court and Congress modified each other’s 
behavior through new decisions and succeeding legislation. 
Congress-Court relations are important in maintaining a working 
republican government.  Both Congress and the Supreme Court have key roles 
 
 2. Douglas R. Williams, Demonstrating and Explaining Congressional Abdication: Why 
Does Congress Abdicate Power?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1013 (1999). 
 3. Id. at 1032. 
 4. Id.  Later, he reminds us about “the possibility that congressional power may present a 
situation in which the benefits to individual legislators of a collective decision not to abdicate war 
powers may outweigh the costs to the legislator of such actions, and yet such a desirable 
collective outcome will not come about.”  Id. at 1040. 
 5. See generally U.S. CONST. 
 6. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (discussing the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)). 
 7. See Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 
(1995). 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994). 
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in preserving the balance of authority within the federal government and 
stabilizing the balance of authority between the federal government and the 
states.  Both statutory and constitutional policies afford frequent opportunities 
for Congress-Court interactions; scholars have found that the Court and 
Congress mainly accept each other’s interpretations and avoid serious 
institutional conflict.  Segal’s separation of powers analysis “demonstrates that 
the Court must be concerned with the preferences of Congress (and 
occasionally the President) if it wishes to be an effective policymaker.”9  
Ferejohn and Weingast examine Congress’s “capacity to react” as a 
fundamental feature of the political process. 10 
Congress has substantial latitude to support or undermine the 
implementation of Court policies.  David O’Brien argues that “Congress 
indubitably has the power to delay and undercut implementation of the Court’s 
rulings.  On major issues of public policy, Congress is likely to prevail or, at 
least, temper the impact of the Court’s Rulings.”11  Congress’s major 
responsibilities include translating and implementing policies which result 
from its right to decide what resources will be used, how and where.  As an 
example of modifying a Supreme Court policy, Congress passed laws, such as 
the Hyde Amendment, that limit funding for and participation of federal 
agencies in providing therapeutic and elective abortions.  Congressional power 
to translate policy into action may be extended and given additional legitimacy 
when the Supreme Court supports Congress’s decisions.  If the Court opposes 
Congress’s decisions, Congress may have less latitude to act and constituency 
groups may mobilize long-term political actions based on competing policy 
definitions. 
Eskridge generally finds a moderate frequency for Congress overriding 
statutory decisions by the Court.12  In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress passed 
major legislation by means of omnibus bills, which avoided conflicts between 
legislators that would prevent the passage of individual acts.13  A single 
omnibus bill can overturn several Supreme Court decisions.14  For instance, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned twelve Supreme Court rulings, especially 
those concerning standards for employer and employee responsibility to prove 
 
 9. Jeffrey Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and 
Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (Mar. 1997). 
 10. John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992). 
 11. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 191 (2000). 
 12. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 
101 YALE L.J. 331, 331-455 (1991). 
 13. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 120 (1997) (arguing that 
scholarly analysis of overrides of statutory decisions is at an early stage). 
 14. Id. 
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discrimination in hiring.15  Conflicts between the Court and Congress 
occasionally become constitutional or statutory crises.16  The issue of whether 
Congress abdicates power becomes more prominent during and after major 
conflicts between branches such as New Deal policies in the 1930’s, 17 civil 
liberties in the 1950’s,18 school prayer in the 1960’s,19 abortion rights in the 
1970’s and 1980’s,20 and Congressional attempts to control executive officials 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s.21 
The Constitution gives Congress authority to remove the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction for certain types of cases.22  Threats by Congress to remove 
jurisdiction attract the attention of both the Court and constituents to a variety 
of socially volatile issues such as school prayer, reproductive rights and 
abortion, criminals’ rights, and minority groups’ rights.  Congress rarely 
removes jurisdiction because of actual and potential negative consequences to 
this exercise of power.  First, denial of jurisdiction by Congress establishes as 
permanent precedent the very Supreme Court rulings that Congress wishes to 
negate.  David O’Brien finds a paradox in Court-curbing legislation: Congress 
denies Court review on major issues of public law and policy that Congress 
originally gave the Court the power to decide and place on its agenda.23  
Second, removal of jurisdiction by Congress renders the future development of 
the law uncertain.  More directed strategies, such as statutory reinterpretation 
and nonstatutory administrative practices, are available to Congress to reverse 
or modify Supreme Court rulings.  Third, direct confrontation between 
Congress and the Court may create a full-scale constitutional conflict.24 
Congressional authority in a wide range of policies and legal matters can be 
potentially diminished by such a conflict. 
Congress can use both legislation and rule making to guide the Supreme 
Court.  Congress encourages judicial interpretation by writing broad laws in 
major social and political areas.25 When cases based on these laws are brought 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508. 
 17. See Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 
729 (1991). 
 18. See generally Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of 
Columbia Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 323-24 (1988). 
 19. See BAUM, supra note 13. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2. 
 23. See O’BRIEN, supra note 11, at 190. 
 24. See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869) (Congress removed the Court’s 
jurisdiction over certain denials of writs of habeas corpus.). 
 25. See Mikva & Bleich, supra note 17; CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE 
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1988) (discussing the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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before the Supreme Court, scholarly analysis shows that the Court anticipates 
Congress’s intent.26  However, with the growth of national interest groups over 
the last few decades, many of which use litigation as a policy vehicle, a 
significant amount of Congress’s major legislation depends on the Court’s and 
other organizations’ acceptance. 
III. CONGRESS-COURT STRATEGIES: ADVANCING POLICY GOALS 
Congress may choose to advance its policy goals by developing 
institutional agendas that allow details of major social and economic 
legislation to be deduced by the federal court, since both Congress and the 
Court use law as an institutional boundary.  Congress and its leaders can 
anticipate the preferences of the Court or individual Justices since these 
preferences can be constrained by legal doctrine. 27  Congress often assumes 
that both branches can support existing policies.  This strategic behavior takes 
into account that Congress can reinterpret Supreme Court rulings if they are 
substantially different from Congress’ statutory policy goals.  Patterns of 
cooperation and conflict between Congress and Court vary across time periods 
and issues, such as administrative rule making.28  Eskridge found that between 
1967 and 1991 Congress overrode 121 Supreme Court statutory decisions and 
220 lower court decisions. 29 
Both Baum30 and Segal31 have formulated models of Justices’ strategic 
behavior to avoid legislative reversal of statutory decisions.  Epstein and 
Knight use Justices’ docket books and papers to demonstrate their concern 
with legislative reversal.32 
Congress’s representational role involves adjustment to policy 
developments.  Broad Congressional delegation of authority to administrative 
agencies creates constitutional ambiguity and opportunities for policy change, 
and leads to court and executive branch interpretations.  Congressional reliance 
on narrowly drawn authority to administrative agencies would require 
legislators to regularly decide rules and administrative practices.  In the last 
two decades, an important part of Congress’s representational role has been to 
make good policy and not administer specific policies. 
It is difficult to analyze whether, when deciding congressional statutes, 
Justices consider the preferences of the current Congress or the Congress that 
passed the law.  How do Justices compare these two sets of congressional 
 
 26. See BAUM, supra note 13. 
 27. See Eskridge, supra note 12. 
 28. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Court 
argues that agencies’ interpretation of ambiguous statutory language should be followed). 
 29. Eskridge, supra note 12. 
 30. See BAUM, supra note 13. 
 31. See Segal, supra note 9. 
 32. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 149-50 (1998). 
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preferences?33 Justices can form expectations, such as the expectation that 
Congress will more credibly reverse statutory than constitutional decisions, 
connected to interaction patterns with Congress and the risk of congressional 
reversal.  Frank Cross indicates a difficulty in using the Court’s assessment of 
the risk of congressional reversal, “[i]n a statutory interpretation action, the law 
dictates that Congress enforce the intent of the enacting Congress, which 
obviously requires consideration of legislative preferences but has little to do 
with the risk of reversal, which involves the preferences of the 
contemporaneous Congress.”34 
Miscalculations in Justices’ forecasting of Congress’s preferences and 
likely outcomes may lead Congress to modify or reverse Supreme Court 
statutory decisions by legislations.  Predicting the actions of Congress is 
difficult because it is multilayered and complex, and its behavior patterns 
within and between chambers are intricate.  Legal and policy issues are not 
completely definable as statutory or constitutional.  Both the Court and 
Congress can bundle or manipulate issues to protect their decisions both 
constitutionally and from the other branch’s changes.  Knowledge of strategic 
interactions between the Court and Congress would be advanced by further 
analysis of Congress’s ability to set boundaries on decision making for the 
Supreme Court and lower federal courts. 
In both positive political theory and attitudinalist models, scholars agree 
that Supreme Court Justices take strategic actions to avoid negative responses 
by Congress, especially regular reversal or reversals in major cases.35  Positive 
political theorists emphasize that the Court protects its preferred policies by 
deferring to Congress’s preferences, especially in statutory cases.36  Attitudinal 
theorists do not see as many constraints from Congress or the President on 
Justices’ votes.37  As noted earlier, Congressional achievement of legislative 
outcomes may require cooperation through Supreme Court decisions.  In any 
given case, Congress cannot be assured of Court cooperation.  However, in a 
series of cases, Congress may have strong expectations that Court behavior 
will be compliant with Congressional decisions.  Few instances exist where the 
opposite pattern occurs, where Congress has strong expectations that Court 
decisions will oppose Congressional decisions.38 
 
 33. See R. Gelly & P. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory 
Decisions, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990). 
 34. Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 527 (1999) (reviewing 
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 32). 
 35. BAUM, supra note 13, at 94. 
 36. Segal, supra note 9, at 26. 
 37. Id. at 33. 
 38. See Mikva & Bleich, supra note 17, e.g. Congress-Court decisions concerning New Deal 
legislation between 1932-1936. 
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It is worthwhile to briefly examine Supreme Court voting patterns to avoid 
reversal by Congress.  It is frequently argued that the risk of congressional 
reversal is reduced by Supreme Court unanimity, such as in Brown v. Board of 
Education39 and U.S. v. Nixon.40  But scholarly analysis has not determined 
how much the risk of reversal is reduced by either unanimity or smaller 
majorities from eight to five votes.41  For example, how much did the 6-3 vote 
for Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith,42 in which Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, influence the near 
unanimous vote by both House and Senate on the religious Freedom 
Restoration Act,43 which overruled that decision?  Knowledge of how an 
individual Justice’s vote or how the Court’s voting patterns function as a signal 
to Congress and its leaders would give this question a clearer answer in terms 
of authority and interactions between Congress and the Court. 
Fisher argues that Congress may turn to federal courts to challenge the 
President’s activities and delay an immediate confrontation between the 
President and Congress.  He questions this approach:  “[o]ne of the by-
products of the War Powers Resolution has been the tendency of legislators to 
turn not to their colleagues to challenge the President but rather to the 
courts.”44  Fisher notes that Congress was uncertain about the constitutionality 
of the provisions of the Line Item Veto Act of 199645 and provided “a 
procedure allowing for expedited review in the courts for challenges that the 
statute violated the Constitution” to resolve its concerns.46  Senator Byrd (D-
WV) called this action “a punt to the courts” which allows federal courts to 
determine the meaning and structure of Congress’s legislation.47  It is difficult 
for a Congress uncertain about major constitutional legislation to protect its 
own prerogatives and develop a collective preference or strategy. 
Congress and the Court entered into a major conflict over the Line Item 
Veto Act.  Congress’s short-run political calculations and readiness to 
relinquish authority made it more difficult in the long run for the Court to 
defend Congress’s authority.  Congress could be seen here as yielding power to 
the federal courts and allowing them to determine where authority lies within 
 
 39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 40. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 41. Gelly & Spiller, supra note 33, at 556.  Epstein and Segal’s initial findings provide 
“some support for the hypothesis that larger majorities have greater political power in the external 
environment.  They also found that more ideologically homogeneous Courts that could command 
larger majorities were less responsive to the risk of reversal from an ideologically contrary 
Congress.”  Id. at n.245 
 42. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 43. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507. 
 44. Fisher, supra note 1, at 968. 
 45. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996). 
 46. Fisher, supra note 1, at 1003. 
 47. Id. 
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the federal system; if similar actions continue, institutional values and the 
institution of Congress may be endangered.  Twelve years earlier, in Bowsher 
v. Synar,48 the Supreme Court overturned the 1985 Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act,49 in which Congress sought to expand 
authority over the budgetary process.  Congress attempted to perform an 
executive function by claiming for itself control over the United States 
Comptroller General’s removal and provisions of the Act that gave it 
responsibility to enforce and execute laws.50  The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act presents another Congress-Court conflict; the Court believes 
that deciding the issues of  this Act belongs to its authority.51 
Canon and Johnson52 indicate that the Court will sometimes invite 
Congress to rewrite a statute to overturn the Court’s decision.53 Spiller and 
Tiller, who use control over policy and legal rules to model Congress-Court 
interactions, argue that Congress is more likely to override Court decisions 
based on policy grounds than on legal rules. 54  In a Court-centered view, the 
judiciary uses Congress’s preferences and institutional structures to achieve its 
own policy ends.55  Spiller and Tiller challenge previous models which give 
Congress and other institutions limited attention in explaining Justices’ votes 
and decision making by the Court.56  They show that “it can be perfectly 
rational for the Court to look for a legislative override; indeed, it sometimes 
openly invites such a legislative response.”57 With the shrinking Supreme 
Court docket, Congress has followed a strategy of overriding lower federal 
court statutory interpretations to establish its policies. 
The 1950s and 1980s featured statutory and constitutional conflict between 
the Court and Congress.  In general, Congress and the Court had different 
ideological positions on many issues, including government actions against 
persons accused of subversive activities and the scope of civil rights laws.  
Congress established an institutional voice that regularly reversed Supreme 
Court decisions.  To give examples, in the late 1950s Congress authorized a 
more conservative interpretation of suspected individuals’ rights against 
 
 48. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 49. 2 U.S.C. § 901 (1985). 
 50. See Bowsher, 487 U.S. at 717. 
 51. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509. 
 52. See generally BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (2d ed. 1999). 
 53. Id. at 148 n. 2.  See, e.g, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 
(1978); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 236 (1981); Dept. of Defense v. Federal Labor 
Relations Authority, 510 U.S. 487, 490-94 (1994). 
 54. Pablo G. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals 
of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 503, 521(1996). 
 55. Id. at 514. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 521. 
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government investigations.  The Supreme Court recognized this 
interpretation’s stability and certainty by reversing some of its earlier rulings 
and restoring investigative power to Congress.58 
In the 1980s, Congress, which opposed conservative Court decisions 
narrowing the scope of civil rights and liberties, passed legislation to broaden 
civil rights protections, especially those of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  For 
example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established that programs 
receiving federal funds could not discriminate based on race or national origin 
and that federal funding could be terminated if the programs discriminated.  In 
Grove City College v. Bell59 the Court, agreeing with the Reagan 
Administration, narrowed the statute’s application to specific programs only, 
not the entire institution, in a case technically involving Title IX of the Federal 
Education Act of 1972.60  Congress overturned this ruling in the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987.61 
Congress’s willingness to rewrite legislation that has been overturned by 
the Supreme Court has been limited by divisions within Congress and the 
constitutional or legislative interpretations of key committee members.  Canon 
and Johnson argue that the Court can make lasting policy interpretations more 
easily when Congress has sharply divided policy preferences.62 But when there 
are solid coalitions opposing the Court in Congress, Congress can enforce its 
preferences against the Court’s.63 
A serious conflict arose between Congress and the Court over the First 
Amendment importance of the United States flag.  The Flag Protection Act of 
198964 overrode Texas v. Johnson65 and was itself overridden by U.S. v. 
Eichmann.66  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act currently poses a 
substantial conflict between positions strongly held by both Congress and the 
Court.  Serious conflicts between Congress and the Supreme Court have often 
been modified by long-term events, such as changes in the Court or Congress’s 
membership.  Two major exceptions, extending across the last generation of 
Congress-Court relationships, have been reproductive rights and racial 
equality/desegregation. 
 
 58. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 108 (1959) (overruling Watkins v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)). 
 59. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
 60. See id. at 558-560. 
 61. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1987). 
 62. CANON AND JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 198. 
 63. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (establishing a uniform voting age of 18 for 
federal elections and overruling Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)). 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1989). 
 65. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 66. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
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Cross argues that “Court decisions do not automatically actualize the 
Court’s policies and the impact of Court opinions may depend upon the 
compliance of Congress or other external actors.”67 The Supreme Court can 
encourage other institutions to comply with its decisions, and Justices often 
assume that noncompliance is more likely for decisions with broader scope.  
Additional legislation, regulation, or appropriations by Congress play an 
important role in achieving compliance by society with the Court’s decisions.  
Congress may achieve additional authority through reinterpreting Court 
decisions.  The judiciary is often faced with deciding between the authority of 
Congress and the President.  In the last decade, on many important domestic 
and international matters the judiciary’s constitutional and statutory 
interpretations appear to shift power from Congress to the President.  By 
expanding presidential authority and limiting Congress’s authority, are federal 
courts involved in forming a more compact constitutional structure? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The American system of government shares the power and responsibility 
of constitutional interpretation among the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches.  The constitutional and statutory relationships among these three 
branches are guided by both short- and long-term considerations.  In a given 
year or over the course of several years, Congress’s authority is concerned in a 
wide range of constitutional and statutory issues before Congress and the 
Supreme Court.  Congress-Supreme Court relationships involve multiple 
strategies which encourage consensus and coalition building among them 
rather than conflict.  Conflicts occur due to different ideological positions, 
varying interpretations of specific constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
central questions about the scope of constitutional authority. 
Congress’s institutional competence in dealing with the courts and the 
executive will affect its attempts to maximize institutional capacity in relations 
with the Supreme Court.  Congress may convey its institutional authority 
through statutory language, setting institutional boundaries for Supreme Court 
interpretation of statutes and regulations, and threatening increased 
jurisdictional or budgetary controls over federal courts.  No determinative set 
of criteria for Congressional limitation on Court decisions was found.  Such 
criteria should not be expected since Congress has given the Supreme Court 
power to set its own agenda and decide major constitutional and statutory 
matters.  It would be difficult for Congress to use long-term institutional 
strategies in specific cases to fully exercise its institutional powers and 
abilities.  Congress has increasingly received its expected payoffs from short-
 
 67. Cross, supra note 34, at 525. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] CONGRESS-SUPREME COURT RELATIONS 127 
term reactions to Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s, with 
divided governments as the national norm. 
The majority of scholars working on Congress-Court relationships 
consider short-term strategies; additional scholarship is necessary to study 
interactions based on long-term strategies.  A main question for further 
investigation is how Supreme Court Justices and leaders in Congress build and 
stabilize institutional relationships in the area of statutory and constitutional 
interpretation.  Since policy and legal boundaries between Congress and Court 
may change over time, long-term strategic practices need to be discussed and 
analyzed. 
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